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ARTICLES
WHEN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
NO LONGER PROTECT YOUR
BUSINESS INTERESTS: THE
STRANGE WORLD OF THIRD PARTY
BUSINESS INTERESTS UNDER
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
LEGISLATION
EMIR ALY CROWNE-MOHAMMED*
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of information legislation is designed to promote just that –
access to governmental information. The Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act of British Columbia (“BC Act”) is no different.
The BC Act views access to governmental information as promoting democracy, transparency, and citizenry, thereby making “public bodies
more accountable to the public and. . . protect[ing] personal privacy by. . .
giving the public a right of access to records”1 inter alia.
The right to access governmental information, however, is not unfettered. There are certain protected instances where the public good may
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. I may be contacted at
emir@uwindsor.ca. I gratefully acknowledges the timely and insightful feedback of Richard Austin, Barrister & Solicitor (and former General Counsel to EDS Canada Inc., an HP
Company); and the unseen efforts and assistance of the entire editorial team at the Journal
of Computer and Information Law.
1. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 165, § 2, sched.
1 (1996), available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/freeside/—%20F%20—/Freedom%20of%20Information%20and%20Protection%20of%20Privacy%20Act%20%20RSBC%
201996%20%20c.%20165/00_Act/96165_01.xml (emphasis added) [hereinafter FIPPA].
Under the BC Act, “records” are defined broadly to include “books, documents, maps, drawings, photographs, letters, vouchers, papers and any other thing on which information is
recorded or stored by graphic, electronic, mechanical or other means, but does not include a
computer program or any other mechanism that produces records.” Id.
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actually be harmed by undue access to governmental information such
as policy recommendations developed by or for a Minister, legal advice,
or disclosures harmful to law enforcement or individual safety.2 Therefore, an applicant requesting a record may receive a redacted copy of the
contract that only exposes the information that is not exempt under the
BC Act.3
The focus of this article is section 21(1) of the BC Act, entitled “Disclosure harmful to business interests of a third party,” which provides
that:
The head of a public body must refuse to disclose to an applicant
information
(a) that would reveal
(i) trade secrets of a third party, or
(ii) commercial, financial, labour relations, scientific or technical information of or about a third party,
(b) that is supplied, implicitly or explicitly, in confidence, and
(c) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
(i) harm significantly the competitive position or interfere significantly with the negotiating position of the third party,
(ii) result in similar information no longer being supplied to the
public body when it is in the public interest that similar information
continue to be supplied,
(iii) result in undue financial loss or gain to any person or organization, or
(iv) reveal information supplied to, or the report of, an arbitrator,
mediator, labour relations officer or other person or body appointed
to resolve or inquire into a labour relations dispute.4

II. LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
Section 21(1) is most often triggered when public bodies enter into outsourcing arrangements or similar types of contracts with private third
2. The BC Act sets out the following exceptions: cabinet and local public body confidences (sec. 12); policy advice or recommendations (sec. 13); legal advice (sec 14); disclosure
harmful to law enforcement (sec 15); disclosure harmful to intergovernmental relations or
negotiations (sec. 16); disclosure harmful to the financial or economic interests of a public
body (sec. 17); disclosure harmful to the conservation of heritage sites, etc; (sec. 18) disclosure harmful to individual or public safety (sec. 19); information that will be published or
released within sixty (60) days (sec. 20); disclosure harmful to business interests of a third
party (sec. 21); disclosure harmful to personal privacy (sec. 22); and disclosure of information relating to abortion services (sec. 22.1).
3. For instance, section 23 of the BC Act (entitled “Notifying the third party”) sets out
the parameters and timelines for the Government to notify a “third party” that some, or all,
of their information may be subject to disclosure; and to provide them with a window of
time to object.
4. FIPPA, supra note 1 at ch. 165, § 2, sched. 21(1).
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parties.5 Applicants requesting access to a governmental record will also
expose third party business interests due to the nature of the outsourced
obligations.6 The burden will always rest with the third party to demonstrate that the information in question satisfied all three limbs of the
statutory provision, namely, that: (1) it was sensitive business information; (2) supplied in confidence; and (3) that would result in a loss of competitiveness (whether in terms of negotiating leverage, or overall
marketplace/economic competitiveness).7 It is the term “supplied” that
will receive the bulk of the attention in this article. The aim is to show
that both the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner
(the “Commissioner”) and the British Columbia Courts (“BC Courts”)
have interpreted and applied the term in an artificial, arcane, and unreasonable manner.
It should be noted that public bodies themselves are often protected
through other provisions in the BC Act. Thus, insofar as the public bodies’ interests are protected from public disclosure, there is little incentive
to protect the third party’s legitimate business interests. For instance,
section 17 of the BC Act is drafted with considerable discretion and deference to Governmental interests:
(1) The head of a public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant
information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
harm the financial or economic interests of a public body or the government of British Columbia or the ability of that government to manage
the economy, INCLUDING the following information:
(a) trade secrets of a public body or the government of British
Columbia;
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that belongs to a public body or to the government of British Columbia and
that has, or is reasonably likely to have, monetary value;
(c) plans that relate to the management of personnel of or the administration of a public body and that have not yet been implemented or
made public;
(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
result in the premature disclosure of a proposal or project or in undue
financial loss or gain to a third party;
(e) information about negotiations carried on by or for a public body or
the government of British Columbia;
5. See University of British Columbia, Order 03-02 (2003), available at http://www.
oipcbc.org/orders/2003/Order03-02.pdf. It discusses access to a University’s records for the
on-campus supply of goods and services for a review. Id.
6. See University of British Columbia, Order F09-04 (2009), available at http://www.
oipcbc.org/orders/2009/OrderF09-04.pdf. It relates to the disclosure of the Ministry of Provincial Revenue’s revenue management contract with EDS Advanced Solutions Inc. (where
part of the Province’s revenue management and collection functions were outsourced to
EDS Advanced Solutions).
7. Id.
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(f) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
harm the negotiating position of a public body or the government of
British Columbia.8

Additionally, the term “supplied” has been feverishly interpreted to
mean information provided by a third party that was not negotiated. For
instance, in Order 03-04, the Commissioner held that when an agreement is negotiated between a public body and third party, any information disclosed will not qualify as information “supplied” to the public
body.9 In the same order, the Commissioner, however, carved out an exception stating that, “the exceptions to this tend to be information that,
though in a contract between a public body and a third party, is not susceptible of negotiation and change and is likely of a proprietary
nature.”10
8. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1996, 165 R.S.B.C., § 2,
sched. 17 (Eng.), available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/freeside/—%20F%20—
/Freedom%20of%20Information%20and%20Protection%20of%20Privacy%20Act%20%20
RSBC%201996%20%20c.%20165/00_Act/96165_01.xml.
9. OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 03-04 para 30
(2003), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2003/Order03-04.pdf [hereinafter ORDER
NO. 03-04]. See also OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 0139 (2001), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2001/Order01-39.html [hereinafter ORDER NO. 01-39]; OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 01-40
(2001), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2001/Order01-40.html; OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 03-03 (2003), available at http://www.
oipc.bc.ca/orders/2003/Order03-03.pdf [hereinafter ORDER NO. 03-03]; OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 03-15 (2003), available at http://www.oipc.bc.
ca/orders/2003/Order03-15.pdf [hereinafter ORDER NO. 03-15]; OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION
& PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 04-06 (2004), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2004/Order04-06.pdf [hereinafter ORDER NO. 04-06]. The BC Courts have also embraced this interpretation on judicial review. See Jill Schmidt Health Serv. Inc. v. British
Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) et. al., [2001] B.C.S.C. 101 (Can.) available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/01/01/2001bcsc0101.htm. Other courts have
also adopted a similar interpretation as well. See Boeing Co. v. Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), [2005] 200 O.A.C. 134 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2005/2005canlii24249/2005canlii24249.pdf; Canada Post v. Canada
(Minister of Public Works), [2004] F.C. 270 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/
fct/doc/2004/2004fc270/2004fc270.html; Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government
Serv.) v. Hi-Rise Group Inc., [2004] 238 D.L.R. (4th) 44 (Can.), available at http://www.
canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2004/2004fca99/2004fca99.html.
10. ORDER NO. 03-04, supra note 9. See also ORDER NO. 01-39, supra note 9;
B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 40, ORDER NO. 03-03, supra note 9; B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 3; ORDER NO. 03-15,
supra note 9; ORDER NO. 04-06, supra note 9. The BC courts have also embraced this interpretation on judicial review, see Jill Schmidt Health Services Inc., [2001] B.C.J. No. 79,
supra note 9 (upholding ORDER NO. 00-22 (2000) B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 25); Canadian Pacific
Railway v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) et al., [2002] B.C.J.
No. 848, 2002 BCSC 603 (upholding ORDER NO. 01-39). Other courts have also adopted a
similar interpretation as well. See Boeing Co. v. Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), [2005] O.J. No. 2851; Canada Post v. Canada (Minister of Public Works),
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This narrow interpretation of the term “supplied” appears to have
been imported into British Columbian law by the Commissioner in
1994.11 At that time, the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner
had already reviewed the applicability of the third party business information exception (section 21(1) in the British Columbia legislation), and
determined that for information “supplied” by the third party to a public
body, the information must be the same as that originally provided by
the affected person.12
Although the Commissioner extended the Ontario interpretation to
British Columbia at that time, the Commissioner cautioned that, “a
strict application of this interpretation could produce results that were
not intended by the legislators.”13 As will be discussed later in this work,
the entire rationale for this interpretation is flawed because it ignores
the purpose of the BC Act and the realities of competitive bidding.
It then took another seven years before the Commissioner set forth a
more extensive discussion of the term “supplied.” In Order 01-39, the
Commissioner noted, “the fact that the requested records are contracts
therefore suggests that the information in them was negotiated rather
than supplied.”14
[2004] F.C.J. No. 415 (TD) affirmed [2004] F.C.J. No. 2016 (CA); Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services) v. Hi-Rise Group Inc., [2004] F.C.J. No. 468 (C.A.).
11. In Order No. 26-1994, a labor union sought access to a contract between the British
Columbia Hydro and Power Authority and Westech Information Systems Inc. . OFFICE OF
THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 26-94 (1994), available at http://
www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/1994/Order26.html [hereinafter ORDER NO. 26-94].
12. Ministry of Environment and Energy, Ontario Order P-609, page 2 (January 12,
1994) (stating that since the information contained in an agreement is typically the product
of a negotiation process between the institution and a third party, that information will
not qualify as originally having been ‘supplied’ for the purposes of section 17(1) of the Act.).
See also Re: Stadium Corporation of Ontario Limited, Ontario Order P-263, page 17 (January 24, 1992). “The information contained in these records was the result of negotiations
between the institution and the affected parties and does not consist of information ‘supplied’ by the affected parties to the institution. In addition, I cannot conclude that disclosure of the records would permit the drawing of accurate inferences about information
actually supplied to the institution by the affected parties, and, therefore, the institution
and affected parties have failed to satisfy the second part of the section 17(1) test.” Id. See
also ORDER NO. 26-1994, supra note 11 (citing Ministry of Natural Resources, Ontario Order P-385, page 3 (December 18, 1992)). “It has been established that information which is
the result of contractual negotiations between a governmental institution and an affected
person, does not qualify as information which has been ‘supplied’, regardless of whether
this information may have been treated confidentially.” Id.
13. ORDER NO. 26-94, supra note 11.
14. ORDER NO. 01-39, supra note 9. By their nature, contracts are negotiated between
the contracting parties. Id. It is up to. . .the party resisting disclosure, to establish with
evidence that all or part of the information contained in the contracts including their schedules was not negotiated, as would normally be the case, but was “supplied” within the
meaning of § 21(1)(b). Id. See also OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER,
ORDER NO.00-09 (2000), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2000/Order00-09.html;
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In that same order, however, the Commissioner also acknowledged
that information that might otherwise be considered ‘negotiated’ may be
supplied in at least two circumstances.15 First, the information will be
found to be supplied if it is relatively “immutable” or not susceptible of
change.16 In other words, information may come from a single person
and remain relatively unchanged, yet this does not necessarily mean
that the information is “supplied.”17 Second, where disclosure of the information would allow a reasonably informed observer to draw accurate
inferences about the underlying confidential information that was “supplied” by the third party, that is, about information not expressly contained in the contract.18
As noted earlier, this interpretation is narrow and unreasonable.
Section 17(1) of Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Pri-

OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 00-22 (2000), available
at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2000/Order00-22.html; OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 00-24 (2000), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/
2000/Order00-24.html; OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO.
00-39 (2000), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2000/Order00-39.html; OFFICE OF
THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. 01-20, para. 81-89 (2001), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/2001/Order01-20.html [hereinafter ORDER NO. 01-20].
The thrust of the reasoning in all of these decisions is that the information contained in
contractual terms is generally negotiated. Information may be delivered by a single party
or the contractual terms may be initially drafted by only one party, but that information or
those terms are not “supplied” if the other party must agree to the information or terms in
order for the agreement to proceed. ORDER NO. 01-39, supra note 9.
15. ORDER NO. 01-20, supra note 14.
16. For example, if a third party has certain fixed costs (such as overhead or labour
costs already set out in a collective agreement) that determine a floor for a financial term in
the contract, the information setting out the overhead cost may be found to be “supplied”
within the meaning of s. 21(1)(b). To take another example, if a third party produces its
financial statements to the public body in the course of its contractual negotiations, that
information may be found to be “supplied.” It is important to consider the context within
which the disputed information is exchanged between the parties. A bid proposal may be
“supplied” by the third party during the tendering process. However, if it is successful and
is incorporated into or becomes the contract, it may become “negotiated” information, since
its presence in the contract signifies that the other party agreed to it.
17. ORDER NO. 01-39, supra note 9 (emphasis added) (citing ORDER NO. 01-20 (2001)).
The intention of § 21(1)(b) is to protect information of the third party that is not susceptible
of change in the negotiation process, not information that was susceptible of change but,
fortuitously, was not changed. In Order 01-20, Commissioner Loukidelis rejected an argument that contractual information furnished or provided by a third party and accepted
without significant change by the public body is necessarily “supplied” within the meaning
of § 21(1). Id. Most recently, in Order 01-20, Commissioner Loukidelis again stated that
information provided by one party and accepted by another (as evidenced by its inclusion in
the contract), is negotiated, not “supplied” information. Id.
18. ORDER NO. 01-39, supra note 9 at 50.
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vacy Act (the “Ontario Act”) deals with third party information.19 It
states that:
A head shall refuse to disclose a record that reveals a trade secret or
scientific, technical, commercial, financial or labour relations information, supplied in confidence implicitly or explicitly, where the disclosure
could reasonably be expected to,
(a) prejudice significantly the competitive position or interfere significantly with the contractual or other negotiations of a person, group of
persons, or organization;
(b) result in similar information no longer being supplied to the institution where it is in the public interest that similar information continue
to be supplied;
(c) result in undue loss or gain to any person, group, committee or financial institution or agency; or
(d) reveal information supplied to or the report of a conciliation officer,
mediator, labour relations officer or other person appointed to resolve a
labour relations dispute.20

On judicial review, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has twice
upheld the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner’s (the “Ontario Commissioner”) finding that “supplied” must refer to the non-negotiated aspects of outsourcing (and other) contracts. First, in Boeing Co. v.
Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), where a labor
union had requested details of sale between Boeing (and others) and the
Government of Ontario’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade,
the Court upheld the Ontario Commissioner’s findings.21 The court
stated that although the contract contained commercial, financial, and
labor relations information, the information (as a whole) had not been
“supplied” to the Ministry.22 Even where the contract is preceded by limited negotiation, or where the final agreement substantially reflects information that originated from a single party, the Ontario Commissioner
19. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O., ch. F 31 §17.1
(1990), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90f
31_e.htm.
20. Id.
21. The Commissioner’s approach in this case was consistent with the approach taken
in other cases interpreting § 17(1). The Commissioner has consistently found that information in a contract is typically the product of a negotiation process between the parties and
that the content of a negotiated contract involving a governmental institution and another
party will not normally qualify as having been “supplied.” Boeing Co. v. Ontario (Ministry
of Economic Development and Trade), [2005] 200 O.A.C. at para. 18-19, 134 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2005/2005canlii24249/2005canlii24249.pdf.
The Commissioner took the view that the records did not contain information which was
supplied to the Ministry because the information was found in complex contracts which
were the subject of agreement by a number of parties. Id.
22. Boeing Co. v. Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), [2005] 200
O.A.C. 134 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2005/2005canlii242
49/2005canlii24249.pdf.
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concluded that the information was not “supplied.”23 It has also been
held that even a bid or proposal that was furnished in response to an
RFP or tendering process is not necessarily ‘supplied’, especially if the
bid is successful.24
Then, in Canadian Medical Protective Assn. v. John Doe, the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice again reviewed the adjudicator’s decision
(based on the standard of “reasonableness”).25 The case concerned a request to obtain details of a membership fee arrangement between the
Canadian Medical Protective Association and the Ontario Medical Association.26 Here, the Court upheld the adjudicator’s decision regarding
the section 17(1) disclosure, stating “as a general rule, information in a
contract will be considered ‘mutually generated’ as opposed to ‘supplied’
unless it can be shown that the information would reveal information
actually supplied by the third party.”27
23. Boeing Co. v. Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), [2005] 200
O.A.C. at para. 18-19, 134 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2005/
2005canlii24249/2005canlii24249.pdf.
24. See ORDER NO. 03-15, supra note 9 at para. 66.
An RFP process aims to generate competitive proposals from qualified parties for
the provision of goods or services to government. If all goes well, it leads to the
government contracting with one, or more, of the proposing parties to provide the
goods or services sought. It would hardly be surprising that terms in a contract
arrived at resemble, or are even the same as, terms in the contractor’s proposal. It
might well be more unusual for the contract arrived to be completely out of step
with the terms of the contractor’s proposal. A successful proponent on an RFP may
have some or all of the terms of its proposal incorporated into a contract. As has
been said in past orders, there is no inconsistency in concluding that those terms
have been “negotiated” since their presence in the contract signifies that the other
party agreed to them. Id.
25. Canadian Med. Protective Ass’n v. Loukidelis, [2008] D.L.R. (4th) 134, available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2008/2008canlii45005/2008canlii45005.pdf. The Adjudicator held that the parties had failed to meet their onus of proving that the information
(except for Table 1) in the 2004 MOU was “supplied” under s. 17(1) for the following
reasons:
a) the 2004 MOU was an end product of a negotiation process, and sets out mutually agreed upon terms;
b) disclosure of the 2004 MOU would not reveal, or permit the drawing of accurate
inferences with respect to, any information actually supplied to the Ministry;
c) Appendices 1 and 2 relate to and expand upon, the provisions of the main agreement, as they are not distinguishable from the main agreement for the purpose of
the “supplied” issue;
d) although the information in Appendix 2 may have been originally provided by
the CMPA, the methodology has come to represent the negotiated intention of all
the parties;
e) Table 1, relating to a previous year (2002), was attached for the purpose of illustrating the format of future Tables, and the data within Table 1 was to be used for
future calculations; therefore, it was supplied and not negotiated. Id.
26. Id. at para. 39.
27. Canadian Med. Protective Ass’n v. Loukidelis, [2008] D.L.R. (4th) 134, available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2008/2008canlii45005/2008canlii45005.pdf.
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III. ANALYSIS
This narrow and stifling interpretation of “supplied” renders the section 21(1) exception (and the section 17(1) exception under the Ontario
Act) meaningless and devoid of any air of commercial reality. All government contracts are negotiated. Short of a trade secret, or (perhaps) a proprietary pricing formula.28 nothing would ever be “supplied” to the
public body under this approach. The power imbalance in governmental
contracting and negotiations is painfully evident, even for the most influential corporations. Everything is negotiated.
“Supplied” must be interpreted in a manner that permits even negotiated information to be withheld from public disclosure. The Supreme
Court of Canada has expressly noted that:
When one interpretation can be placed upon a statutory provision
which would bring about a more workable and practical result, such an
interpretation should be preferred if the words invoked by the Legislature can reasonably bear it.29

That is precisely the situation here. Public bodies outsource certain
functions to third parties,30 thereby enhancing the public good through
the efficiency and competitiveness of the private sector. Thus, it is necessary that the interests of these third parties be protected under the BC
Act’s exceptions.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly endorsed a
purposive approach to statutory interpretation. For instance, in Verdun
v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, the court stated that:
Courts are obliged to determine the meaning of legislation in its total
context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules
of interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words,
the courts must consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the
court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate.31
28. Even in this instance it is unclear if this would be protected, since the pricing
formula itself might have been the subject of intense negotiation(s), or intense scrutiny (at
the very least). See supra Order F08-22.
29. Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 94, 2003 SCC 9 (Can.) citing Berardinelli v.
Ontario Housing Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275, per Estey J., at p. 284, available at http://csc.
lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2003/2003scc9/2003scc9.pdf (emphasis added).
30. Like revenue management and the collection of outstanding fines or dues in Order
F09-04. OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ORDER NO. F09-04 (2009),
available at http://www.oipcbc.org/orders/2009/OrderF09-04.pdf [hereinafter ORDER NO.
F09-04].
31. Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550 (Can.), available at
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1996/1996rcs3-550/1996rcs3-550.pdf. (quoting ELMER A.
DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES PG 131 (Butterworths 2d ed. 1983)) (emphasis in
original).
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Additionally, the court determined that an appropriate interpretation
can be justified in terms of its plausibility, efficacy, and acceptability.32
This is, of course, is an expansion of Professor Driedger’s more concise statement that “today there is only one principle or approach,
namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in
their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.” 33
Therefore, by examining the purpose of the BC Act (to make public
bodies more accountable to the public),34 it is clear that the rights, responsibilities, and protections afforded under the BC Act are not absolute and must be interpreted to give due regard to countervailing
considerations and interests. Even Ontario’s Act states that its purpose
is:
to provide a right of access to information under the control of institutions in accordance with the principles that, (i) information should be
available to the public, (ii) necessary exemptions from the right of access should be limited and specific.”35

The Act recognizes that access to information is not an absolute
right, but must be weighed against other competing considerations.
Given the enumerated exceptions under the BC Act, it must be interpreted so as to provide a limited right of access to information, and
must be weighed against other countervailing interests. There is a balance that must be struck between making public bodies more accountable to the public and third parties’ interests in protecting their
information from unfair public disclosure. Currently, the interpretation
of the word “supplied,” skews this balance heavily in favor of the applicant, with little (if any) regard to alternative interpretations that give
rise to a more workable and practical result.36
In a recent decision, the Commissioner continues to disregard the
balance that must be struck in interpreting and applying the BC Act.37
32. Id.
33. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (Can.), available at http://csc.
lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998rcs1-27/1998rcs1-27.pdf (quoting ELMER A. DRIEDGER,
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 87 (Butterworths 2d ed. 1983)). But see, Emir Crowne-Mohammed, How Many Times Have You Been Cited By The Supreme Court, 35 ADVOCATES’ Q.
170-80 (2009) (discussing the subtle difference between Driedger and Sullivan’s formulation of the modern approach.); See also Council of Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [1997] 153 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/
bcca/doc/1997/1997canlii2009/1997canlii2009.pdf.
34. FIPPA, supra note 1 at sec. 2 (emphasis added).
35. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O., ch. . F 31 §17.1
(1990), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90f
31_e.htm.
36. ORDER NO. 03-04, supra note 9.
37. ORDER NO. F09-04, supra note 30.
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The Commissioner states that the BC Act:
should be administered with a clear presumption in favour of disclosure. . . [as] nowhere is the right of access more important for the accountability of public bodies to the public than in the arena of public
spending through large-scale government outsourcing of public services
to private enterprise. Businesses that contract with government must
fully appreciate that the transparency of those dealings has no comparison in fully private transactions.38

This view is undoubtedly self-serving, since the BC Act clearly states
that its purpose is “to make public bodies more accountable.”39 Contrast
this with Nova Scotia’s Freedom of Information and the Protection of Privacy Act (the “NS Act”) that is drafted in more absolute terms. 40 For
instance, the purpose of NS Act is, “to ensure that public bodies are fully
accountable to the public.”41
The Commissioner’s enthusiastic and partisan views that the BC
Act has a “presumption in favour of disclosure,”42 ignores earlier criticism that section 17(1) of the BC Act was drafted permissively, and favorably, towards governmental interests.43 The legislation does not
require that any of the government’s information be “supplied” as to pre38. Id. at para. 18.
39. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1996, R.S.B.C., c. 165, § 2,
n. 1 (Eng.), available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/freeside/—%20F%20—/
Freedom%20of%20Information%20and%20Protection%20of%20Privacy%20Act%20%20
RSBC%201996%20%20c.%20165/00_Act/96165_01.xml.
40. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1993 S.N.S., ch. 5 (Can.),
available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/regulations/regs/foiregs.htm.
41. Id. at § 2(a). See also Shannex Health Care Mgmt. Inc. v. Nova Scotia (Health),
[2004] NSSC 54, para. 54 (Can.), available at http://decisions.courts.ns.ca/nssc/2004/2004
nssc54.pdf. Although, sub-section 2(a)(iii) does recognize that there are “limited exceptions
to the rights of access.” Id.
42. ORDER NO. F09-04, supra note 30.
43. Section 17 (1) states that:
The head of a public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant information the
disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to harm the financial or economic
interests of a public body or the government of British Columbia or the ability of
that government to manage the economy, including the following information:
(a) trade secrets of a public body or the government of British Columbia;
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that belongs to a
public body or to the government of British Columbia and that has, or is reasonably likely to have, monetary value;
(c) plans that relate to the management of personnel of or the administration
of a public body and that have not yet been implemented or made public;
(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result
in the premature disclosure of a proposal or project or in undue financial loss
or gain to a third party;
(e) information about negotiations carried on by or for a public body or the
government of British Columbia.
(f) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to harm
the negotiating position of a public body or the government of British
Columbia.
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vent disclosure. Indeed, the government may simply “deem” it “financial,
commercial, scientific or technical information that belongs to a public
body or to the government of British Columbia and that has, or is reasonably likely to have, monetary value.”44 The government’s interests are
clearly well protected. There cannot be any presumption in favor of
disclosure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Equity and the principles of natural justice demand that third party
business interests be protected as well. Indeed, as it currently stands,
the only real information that is exempted from disclosure under outsourcing arrangement is the government’s own information. Even pricing information is not immune from disclosure. Consider the decision in
Order F08-2245 concerning access to a housekeeping services agreement
between the Fraser Health Authority and Sodexho MS Canada Ltd.,
where the Commissioner held that even pricing information had not
been “supplied,” and could therefore be released to the applicant. Pricing
information is undoubtedly the most sensitive aspect of an outsourced (or
other) agreement. The steadfast and unreasonable interpretation of the
word “supplied” has effectively silenced the section 21(1) provisions of
BC Act. The Commissioner has completely ignored the reality of modern
business and competitive bidding.
Therefore, it is only if the government body deems some (or most) of
the third party’s business interests to also represent confidential governmental information will be protected. And, in outsourcing arrangements,
often characterized by routine tension and problems, the vulnerability of
the third party is heightened. Indeed, as interpreted by the Commissioner, BC’s Act leaves most of a third party’s business interests at the
capricious and arbitrary whim of governmental bodies.
Furthermore, in allowing a more expansive reading of the word
“supplied,” there is no risk of abuse by third parties, since it is grammatically situated in the midst of a three-part test. Namely, the head of a
public body must refuse to disclose to an applicant information:
(a) that would reveal
(i) trade secrets of a third party, or
(ii) commercial, financial, labour relations, scientific or technical information of or about a third party,
(b) that is supplied, implicitly or explicitly, in confidence, and
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1996, R.S.B.C., c. 165, § 2, sched. 1
(Eng.), available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/freeside/—%20F%20—/Freedom
%20of%20Information%20and%20Protection%20of%20Privacy%20Act%20%20RSBC%20
1996%20%20c.%20165/00_Act/96165_01.xml.
44. Id. at 17(1)(b).
45. [2008] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 40.
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(c) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
(i) harm significantly the competitive position or interfere significantly with the negotiating position of the third party,
(ii) result in similar information no longer being supplied to the
public body when it is in the public interest that similar information
continue to be supplied,
(iii) result in undue financial loss or gain to any person or organization, or
(iv) reveal information supplied to, or the report of, an arbitrator,
mediator, labour relations officer or other person or body appointed
to resolve or inquire into a labour relations dispute.46

Hence third parties must still satisfy the other two parts of the test.
The rules of modern statutory interpretation demand that the Commissioner take a more purposive and practical approach to the definition of
“supplied.” Courts too, on judicial review, should afford less deference to
the views of the Commissioner, as the narrow approach to the word “supplied” is certainly unreasonable, unworkable, and devoid of the realities
of modern contracting.
46. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C., c. 165, § 2, sched.
21(1) (1996), available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/freeside/—%20F%20—/
Freedom%20of%20Information%20and%20Protection%20of%20Privacy%20Act%20%20
RSBC%201996%20%20c.%20165/00_Act/96165_01.xml.
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